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1 Instead of an introduction 
In  our  discussions  leading  up  to  the  Open
MIND collection’s going online, we thought long
and hard  about  how exactly  to  showcase  the
vast  material  in  this  collection  and the  ideas
and motivations behind the project in our edit-
ors’ introduction. We first thought about using
the introduction to briefly summarize the take-
home  message  of  every  single  target  article,
commentary, and reply, as is customary in in-
troductions to edited collections. This struck us,
however,  as  being both unwieldy and redund-
ant:  it  would  have  entailed  summarizing  and
commenting on a total of 117 texts. More im-
portantly, due to the online format of the collec-
tion (including in-text search functions) and the
inclusion of abstracts and keywords in the pa-
pers  themselves,  the  authors  have  already
provided  concise  introductions  to  their  own
texts. Retracing their steps in an editorial intro-
duction would not have added anything to the
value and usability of the collection. 
We then considered using the introduction
to create our own personal best-of-Open-MIND
list,  discussing  what  we  take  to  be  the  most
valuable insights in every single article, or per-
haps even focusing on the contributions that we
personally take to be the most theoretically im-
portant. Though our own list of personal favor-
ites seemed to write itself naturally during the
editing process, this strategy quickly struck us
as being at odds with our motivation for creat-
ing the collection in the first place. Using the
editors’ introduction to create a personal best-of
list would have been highly selective and biased
by  our  own  personal  research  interests  and
styles in a way that we felt would have contra-
dicted  our  own ideal  of  open  mindedness.  In
fact, for this reason, we decided to omit any ref-
erences to the contributions to Open MIND in
this introduction.
These considerations naturally gave rise to a
more difficult and more profound question: What
exactly do we mean by “open mindedness,” not
just in general, but in the context of interdiscip-
linary research on the mind? The strategy of us-
ing the contributions to the Open MIND collec-
tion as a foil for this more general academic vari-
ant of open mindedness was tempting. But again,
we  quickly  realized  that  this  approach  would
strike many readers (as well as, perhaps, some of
our own authors) as highly idiosyncratic, arbit-
rary, or self-important.1 
1 This is not, of course, to deny that we take “Open MINDedness” (as
broadly practiced in the context of this collection) to be an example of
“open mindedness” as a more general epistemic stance. And we are
certainly proud enough of what we like to think of as our little star-
collection to allow ourselves at least a few words on why we think this
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So we decided to use our editors’ introduc-
tion  to  briefly  address  a  difficult,  somewhat
deeper, and in some ways more classical prob-
lem:  that  of  what  genuine open  mindedness
really is and how it can contribute to the Mind
Sciences. The material in the collection speaks
for itself. Here, and in contrast to the vast col-
lection that is Open MIND, we want to be con-
cise. We want to point to the broader context of
a particular  way of  thinking about the mind.
And we want to propose an account of  what
open mindedness could mean in the context of
the  contemporary,  interdisciplinary  Mind  Sci-
ences. This variant of open mindedness is char-
acterized by epistemic humility, intellectual hon-
esty, and a new culture of charity. It also has a
pragmatic dimension: open mindedness of this
kind is research generating and fosters an envir-
onment of sincere and constructive interdiscip-
linary  collaboration.  And  it  is  profoundly  in-
spired by the classical ideals of philosophy as a
pursuit of genuine insight and rational inquiry,
the  importance  of  a  critical  and in  a  certain
sense non-judgmental attitude, and the deep re-
lationship between wisdom and skepticism as an
epistemic practice. Finally, and again very clas-
sically, open mindedness has an ethical dimen-
is the case. To begin with, many of the papers published here explore
new ways of thinking, in the broadest sense, about the mind and new
and innovative ways of driving research forward. In addition and per-
haps most importantly, our choice of the title Open MIND reflects the
idea that by introducing a two-way interaction between senior target
authors and junior commentators through the review process, the com-
mentaries and replies, we wanted to give our commentators the oppor-
tunity to enter into a discussion with more senior and prominent rep-
resentatives of the field. Relatedly, the availability of the online version
of the Open MIND collection to students and researchers from any-
where in the world, free of charge exemplifies theoretical and practical
dimensions of what we consider to be academic open mindedness. And
finally, on many levels, Open MIND was an exercise in editorial open
mindedness. The authors and commentators asked to contribute to
this collection were explicitly encouraged to discuss  any topic  they
themselves thought relevant. The only restriction was that the target
articles fall within the scope of the Mind Sciences. We also tried to
foster a particular type of intellectual atmosphere by encouraging au-
thors, commentators, and reviewers to be consistently constructive and
charitable. Our hope was that this approach would bring out the best
in our contributors in the different stages of the project. In many cases,
we explicitly encouraged our authors to write in a way that would be
accessible to readers from different academic backgrounds and to take
different disciplinary perspectives into account. Generally, the publica-
tion of academic articles always involves a process of give and take
between authors, editors, and reviewers. And we strongly felt that it
would be a good indicator of the success of our collection if, at the end
of the day, our authors were themselves happy and proud of their con-
tributions. This entailed carefully calibrating our own roles as editors
and in many cases leaving the final decision to our authors. 
sion as well: it implies sensitivity to normative
issues,  including  issues  of  an  anthropological,
sociocultural,  and  political  kind.  By  bringing
these different strands of ideas together and cre-
ating  a  bigger  (and  admittedly  still  sketchy)
picture of what “open mindedness” might mean
in the interdisciplinary Mind Sciences, we hope
to  start  a  conversation  about  how  an  open-
minded attitude and a charitable culture of col-
laboration can be cultivated in the future. This
is very much intended as an invitation to fur-
ther  think  about  and  develop  this  topic.  We
hope our readers will join us in this endeavor.
2 Open mindedness as an epistemic 
stance
Open mindedness is not a theoretical position,
but  an  epistemic  practice.  Clearly,  there  are
many different kinds of open mindedness, and
the  precise  way of  characterizing  the  relevant
kind will depend on the subject matter in ques-
tion, or, more simply, on what it is that one is
open minded about. As a first pass at a defini-
tion, we might say that open mindedness, in its
most  general  sense,  is  characterized  by  epi-
stemic humility and adherence to a general ideal
of  intellectual  honesty.  This  is  true  for  open
mindedness in general, but also for the specific
variants we are interested in here, namely open
mindedness in academic research, including in-
terdisciplinary scientific discourse on the mind. 
Whatever else it may be, open mindedness
is also an attitude that is now shared by a grow-
ing  number  of  researchers  in  philosophy  of
mind, cognitive science, neuroscience, and artifi-
cial  intelligence (AI).  We are all  interested in
the deep structure of the human mind and of
conscious experience, but we also recognize how
far away we still are from a unified theoretical
model that could satisfy philosophers and sci-
entists alike, a model that is conceptually con-
vincing, able to integrate all existing data and
make use of different methods at the same time.
We  do  not  want  to  fool  ourselves.  Although
great progress  has been made during the last
five decades, it is not at all clear which combin-
ation of methods and which type of theoretical
approach will  generate  the final  breakthrough
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or even facilitate epistemic progress. We, mean-
ing researchers of different stripes and from dif-
ferent disciplines comprising the Mind Sciences,
including the authors contributing to this col-
lection,  are all  in  the same boat:  we share a
common epistemic goal, and we find ourselves
working in a period of major historical trans-
ition. Progress in the empirical sciences of the
human mind  is  certainly  impressive  and  con-
tinuously gaining momentum, generating large
amounts of new and sometimes surprising data.
At the same time, exciting new approaches in
formal modeling and philosophical meta-theory
are  increasingly  opening  up  new perspectives.
Yet it is not at all clear that we are already ask-
ing the right kinds of questions or exactly which
combination of conceptual and empirical tools
will  do the trick.  Seeing this  fact  clearly  has
already begun to change our attitude. Research-
ers from different disciplines are listening and
talking to each other in new ways. Developing
news forms of inter- (and intra-)disciplinary col-
laboration is  an  integral  part  of  this  process.
“Having an open mind” also refers to a kind of
scientific practice that involves honestly listen-
ing  to  representatives  of  exactly  those  ap-
proaches and academic disciplines that you may
not have expected to make a contribution. 
At the same time, open mindedness, un-
derstood  as  a  fruitful  and  research-generating
epistemic  practice,  should  be  clearly  distin-
guished from arbitrariness,  indecisiveness,  lack
of specificity, and, especially in the context of
philosophy, lack of  conceptual precision. Open
mindedness  is  not  just  any kind of  openness,
and it is different from simply being non-com-
mittal or hedging. The challenge is to develop
an understanding  of  open  mindedness  that  is
guided by theoretical considerations and empir-
ical research findings alike. Ideally, this account
should suggest specific strategies for cultivating
forms of sincere interdisciplinary collaboration,
sharpening  the  underlying  conceptual  issues,
and developing precise predictions for future re-
search.  Open mindedness  of  this  epistemically
fruitful  type  will  often be  more  about  asking
better questions than about committing to spe-
cific answers. It will involve an attitude of will-
ingness  to  question  or  even  reject  one’s  own
prior commitments. It will be inherently critical
(cf.  Lambie 2014).  And it  will,  perhaps,  have
more  to  do  with  striving  for  genuine  under-
standing  than  with  the  search  for  truth  and
knowledge (Taylor 2014). One core idea of the
great philosopher of science Karl Popper, which
is now reappearing in the latest mathematical
theories of brain functioning, was that we are
always  in  contact  with  reality  at  exactly  the
moment at which we falsify a hypothesis:  the
moment  of  failure  is  exactly  the  moment  at
which we touch the world.2 Similarly, the best
scientific theories will be those that most easily
lend themselves to falsification. For this reason,
open mindedness involves, among other things,
endorsing  very  specific  theoretical  positions
purely for the sake of epistemic progress, rather
than for the sake of being right, advancing one’s
career, publishing in high-impact journals, and
so on. Open mindedness is not so much about
the specific content of a belief, be it personal or
theoretical,  but  about the way in which it  is
held.
Searching for the right kinds of questions
without  considering  the  specific  answers  they
are likely to generate or their immediate prac-
tical implications is a good first-order approx-
imation to the specific type of attitude we are
trying to describe. Another is to consider it as
an interdisciplinary variant of  the principle of
charity. Our point is not just that philosophers
should be empirically informed or that neuros-
cientists should listen carefully to constructive
attempts at conceptual or methodological clari-
fication. We need to develop a new culture of
scientific investigation, and this will require new
and sustainable  forms of  interdisciplinary  col-
laboration. In philosophy, the “principle of char-
ity” has long been recognized and pursued in
the form of reading others’ statements accord-
ing to the best, strongest possible interpretation
2 Here is what he said about the fundamental principle of any ideolo-
gical form of rationalism turned weltanschauung: “Uncritical or com-
prehensive rationalism can be described as the attitude of the person
who says ‘I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be de-
fended by means of argument or experience’. […] Now it is easy to see
that this  principle  of  an uncritical  rationalism is  inconsistent;  for
since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or by experi-
ence, it implies that it should itself be discarded” (cited from Popper
2013, p. 435; originally in Popper & Kiesewetter 1945/2003; see Met-
zinger 2013c for a popular discussion).
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—that is, to never attribute irrationality, false-
hoods, or fallacies to another if alternative and
more charitable readings exist. But we also all
know how hard this can be. Still, the point is to
not  gratuitously  maximize  disagreement  with
the aim of  showcasing the novelty or  import-
ance of one’s own arguments. Agreement should
be optimized and as each other’s interpreters,
we should always, whenever possible, prefer the
most coherent reading in order to maximize the
truth or rationality of what another philosopher
says. We now need an interdisciplinary variant
of this principle, and not only in bridging the
gap between the humanities and the so-called
hard sciences of the mind, but also in organiz-
ing novel and more efficient forms of coopera-
tion. This point applies not only to the relation-
ship  between  disciplines,  but  also  to  that
between different generations of researchers. An
optimization problem has to be solved: What is
the  best  way  of  pooling  intellectual  resources
and of  efficiently  structuring  research?  There-
fore,  a  second  step  toward  approximating  an
undogmatic attitude of open mindedness is to
characterize it as an openness to the possibility
that, for mind and consciousness, there may be
no such thing as a single leading or dominating
discipline, no Leitwissenschaft, as we say in Ger-
man.  Rather,  not  only  does  the  connectivity
between  already-existing  research  programs
have to be strengthened, the overall pattern of
scientific  practice also  requires  a new internal
structure. What is needed is a new and as we
will argue genuinely philosophical way of think-
ing.
A  genuine  receptiveness  to  unexpected
ideas and different disciplinary perspectives also
presupposes a certain set of abilities and differ-
ent  types  of  epistemic  virtues.  Some of  these
may  lie  in  the  field  of  what  is  commonly,  if
somewhat  vaguely,  called  “first-person  meth-
ods”, for instance in the systematic cultivation
of contemplative practice (i.e., the philosophic-
ally  motivated  development  of  non-cognitive
and  non-intellectual  epistemic  abilities).  An-
other is tolerance of ambiguity: to not only tol-
erate transient cognitive, conceptual and theor-
etical inconsistencies between disciplines or gen-
erations, but to view certain kinds of ambiguity
as  actually  desirable,  as  a  source  of  progress.
Again, the challenge will be to distinguish pro-
ductive types of ambiguity from those that are
overly cautious or vague,  hampering real  pro-
gress. The same is true, of course, within aca-
demic disciplines  themselves.  Academic discip-
lines are not natural kinds. Contrary to what
some might think, there may be no single au-
thoritative  or  right  way  of  doing  philosophy,
and there may be no clean way to distinguish
philosophy  from the  empirical  sciences.  Open
mindedness  of  the  constructive  kind  will  not
waste time worrying too much about disciplin-
ary demarcation criteria or labels, but will be
open to different methods and approaches both
between and within individual disciplines. Put
differently, it may turn out to be less important
whether a given question or position is philo-
sophical (in the sense of being of a purely con-
ceptual  nature)  or  empirical  than  whether  it
genuinely  helps  advance  the  overall  debate.
Open mindedness clearly also has an inherently
pragmatic dimension. When this kind of toler-
ance of ambiguity, for instance towards discip-
linary borders, but also towards different (and
ideally  complementary)  research  methods  is
paired with conceptual clarity and precision, it
becomes a driving force for research. This bal-
ancing act is what academic open mindedness is
all about. 
3 Open mindedness and the 
phenomenology of (un)certainty
Having  an  open  mind  involves,  among  other
things,  a  specific  way  of  being  noncommittal
with respect to the truth of a theoretical claim
or proposition.  As pointed out  earlier,  this  is
not  the same as  hedging:  one can investigate
and even defend the truth of a proposition or
the adequacy of a given theoretical-conceptual
or empirical model while at the same time ac-
knowledging that it might be false. This contin-
ued openness to the falsifiability of scientific hy-
potheses,  often  associated  with  attempts  to
bring  about  specific  ways  of  establishing  and
testing their falsity, is commonly regarded as a
marker of good scientific practice. It is also the
core of intellectual honesty. As Russell tells us,
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“intellectual integrity [is] the habit of deciding
vexed  questions  in  accordance  with  the  evid-
ence, or of leaving them undecided where the
evidence  is  inconclusive”  (2009,  p.  579).  The
moment at which we give up this openness is
the moment at which we lapse into dogmatism.
The real danger, says Russell, is never the con-
tent of a doctrine, be it religious or political,
but always “the way in which the doctrine is
held” (Russell 2009, p. 582). Of course, this in-
trinsic  connection  between  wisdom  and  not-
knowing has long been recognized (Ryan 2014).
In the  Gorgias,  Socrates explicitly claims that
he is happy to be refuted if he is wrong. In fact,
he claims he would rather be refuted than to re-
fute someone else because it is better to be de-
livered  from  harm  oneself  than  to  deliver
someone else  from harm.  And in the  Apology
(21d), after being accused of blasphemy and of
corrupting the youths of Athens, Socrates fam-
ously states, before the tribunal of 501 Atheni-
ans,  “I neither  know nor think that  I  know”.
Both in Western and in Eastern philosophy, the
acknowledgment of not-knowing has long been
regarded as an antidote to epistemic harm.
This is not the place to enter into a dis-
cussion of  open mindedness  in  the context  of
the philosophy of science or to trace the history
of philosophical theorizing about the concept of
“wisdom”. We do, however, want to draw atten-
tion an important point: open mindedness as an
epistemic  practice  involves  a  specific  kind  of
mental attitude and is closely related to certain
kinds of phenomenal states. Cultivating the rel-
evant kinds of conscious states and epistemic at-
titudes makes a real  difference, or so we sus-
pect,  by facilitating  the  development of  a  re-
search climate that is conducive to constructive
and genuinely fruitful discourse and new forms
of collaboration. This is an empirical prediction,
and it could turn out to be false. For now, our
claim is that the kind of open mindedness we
describe here is needed if we are even to begin
investigating the truth of this prediction. If, at
the end of the day, this strategy should fail —
that is, if there turn out to be good empirical
reasons for rejecting the claim that there actu-
ally are specific phenomenological profiles and
mental  attitudes  that  decisively  facilitate  pro-
gress in interdisciplinary research on the mind—
this would be a valuable insight. But this in-
sight about the value of open mindedness in sci-
entific discourse itself depends on an initial will-
ingness  to  cultivate  exactly  the  kind  of  epi-
stemic practice in question. 
If this is right, there is another reason to
be interested in open mindedness in the present
context.  This  is  that  open mindedness,  as  an
epistemic practice and mental attitude, is itself
a  potential  target  for  interdisciplinary  con-
sciousness research. Philosophy of mind in par-
ticular can contribute by laying the theoretical–
conceptual groundwork for the further empirical
investigation  of  open  mindedness  in  academic
life and proposing points of contact with psy-
chology  and  cognitive  neuroscience.  To  make
this  inner  connection  more  clearly  visible,  we
will now briefly sketch the outlines of such an
account. 
Where might one begin investigating open
mindedness as a mental state? At the outset, it
stands to reason that the relevant form of open
mindedness  has  precursors  in  the  history  of
philosophy and might also be interestingly re-
lated to current debates on philosophical meth-
odology.  After  all,  the  principles  of  epistemic
humility, intellectual honesty, charitability, and
searching for more accurate questions while cul-
tivating a productive form of tolerance of ambi-
guity are deeply rooted in the history of philo-
sophy. On a systematic and more general level,
one would expect philosophy, as the discipline
traditionally most concerned with the status of
knowledge and truth and the practice of inquiry
itself,  to  be able  contribute  to an analysis  of
what open mindedness really is. Based on these
considerations, four questions seem particularly
relevant: one, what is the relationship between
open mindedness,  intuitions,  and philosophical
methodology?  Two,  what  is  the  relationship
between open mindedness and the tradition of
philosophical  skepticism?  Three,  what  would
answers to the first two questions tell us about
the relationship between open mindedness and
the allegedly most pressing problem for interdis-
ciplinary consciousness research, the subjectiv-
ity of phenomenal mental states? Might we even
use the analysis of open mindedness to formu-
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late principles for the investigation of phenom-
enal states and the status of first-person data?
And four, how is open mindedness as an epi-
stemic  stance  related  to  ethical  and  practical
questions? For instance, how can the analysis of
open mindedness contribute to normative issues
related  to  neurotechnological  interventions  in
the human brain? And does it lead to any spe-
cific suggestions on how to cultivate new forms
of interdisciplinarity?
3.1 Intuitions and the phenomenology of 
certainty
The concept of intuition has a long philosoph-
ical history and is also firmly rooted in every-
day language and folk psychology.3 Intuition, in
everyday language, refers to immediate and dir-
ect  insight,  independent  of  reflection,  to  in-
stinctively grasping or sensing a matter of fact.
In the history of philosophy, the concept of in-
tuition often has dual epistemic and experiential
readings, and this is true for the traditions of
rationalism and empiricism alike. In the  Rules
for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind  (Rule  3),
Descartes describes intuitions as an immediate,
effortless,  and indubitable  kind of  seeing with
the mind, which is even more reliable than de-
duction. In his  Essay Concerning Human Un-
derstanding (IV.II.I),  Locke tells us that intu-
ition involves a direct perception of ideas that
is, once more, the basis of all forms of know-
ledge. The close relationship between intuitions
and sensory perception, and especially seeing, is
already evident in the Latin verb intueri, which
means to look and observe, but also to examine
or consider. The central underlying element is
the  immediacy  and  directness  of  perception,
which is imported into the concept of intuition
via an implicit analogy between the phenomeno-
logy of sensory perception and genuine insight
in an epistemic sense. 
The epistemic status of intuitions, as well
as different ways of defining the concept of intu-
ition, are a matter of controversy in the current
debate on philosophical methodology. The de-
bate on intuitions stands at the center of the
3 This  section  draws  on  arguments  first  presented  in  Metzinger &
Windt (2014).
confrontation between classical and allegedly in-
tuition-based conceptual analysis conducted in
the proverbial philosophical armchair (for crit-
ical discussion, see  Cappelen 2012) and recent
claims  from  experimental  philosophy.  Experi-
mental  philosophy typically  involves  collecting
laypersons’  responses  to  vignettes  inspired  by
well-known  philosophical  thought  experiments
(for discussion, see Knobe & Nichols 2008; Alex-
ander 2012; for a general introduction to intu-
itions in philosophy, see Pust 2014). These ques-
tionnaires are supposed to offer a new, empiric-
ally-based  method  for  investigating  intuitions
and the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Ac-
cording to some experimental philosophers (for
discussion and further references, see Alexander
& Weinberg 2007), the results of these types of
studies cast doubt on the reliability of intuitions
as a mark of philosophical expertise. Intuitions,
in this view, are simply too variable and con-
text-dependent to count as insights in any deep,
epistemologically interesting sense.
Here, we would like to propose a definition
of intuitions that is compatible with the histor-
ical literature as well as being phenomenologic-
ally and empirically plausible.  Departing from
our brief remarks on the history of intuitions in
philosophy,  we suggest  that intuitions are the
“phenomenal  signature  of  knowing”,  a  seem-
ingly direct and effortless way of perceiving or
seeing with one’s mind arising independently of
a  prior  process  of  reflection.  The  analogy
between  intuiting  and  perceiving  provides  an
entry point for a naturalized concept of  intu-
ition. But it also suggests a potentially danger-
ous equivocation between phenomenological and
epistemological readings of the concept of intu-
ition. If  the phenomenology of intuiting is in-
deed similar to that of perceiving in virtue of its
effortless and seemingly direct experiential qual-
ity,  then  this  immediately  poses  the  problem
that  the phenomenology of  intuiting and per-
ceiving can be deceptive: what seems, subject-
ively, to be a case of veridical perception can al-
ways turn out to be a hallucination or an illu-
sion (for an introduction to the problem of per-
ception, see Crane 2014), or a nocturnal dream
(see Windt & Metzinger 2007; Metzinger 2013a;
Windt 2015). Similarly, what seems to bear the
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open MIND?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(GI). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 6 | 28
www.open-mind.net
marks of genuine insight can always turn out to
be an epistemic illusion.4 
If intuitions are indeed mental states char-
acterized by a specific phenomenology, this sug-
gests that the attempt to simultaneously char-
acterize them both as involving genuine insight
and as  the  basis  of  knowledge  rests  on  what
elsewhere we call the “E-error”: a category mis-
take in which epistemic properties are ascribed
to something that does not intrinsically possess
them (Metzinger & Windt 2014, p. 287). If our
account of intuitions is on the right track, then
intuitions are potentially dangerous, because in
virtue  of  their  phenomenology  and their  pos-
sessing an occurrent conscious character of “in-
sight”, they predispose us to believe certain pro-
positions merely on the basis of seemingly “un-
derstanding” them. The phenomenology of intu-
itions  is  such  that  it  immediately  and effort-
lessly creates a bias towards accepting the truth
of  propositions  that,  subjectively,  we  simply
know or  feel  to  be true,  while  simultaneously
preventing us from seeking further justification,
because these truths also seem unconstructed,
indubitable, and self-evident. In this view, one
of the factors underlying intuitions and intuitive
4 For a striking case study of two patients who experienced strong feel-
ings  of  subjective  certainty,  including  religious  beliefs,  during  epi-
leptic seizures, see Picard (2013). These cases are particularly inter-
esting as these beliefs seemed entirely convincing during the seizures,
even  though  they  contradicted  the  patients’  longstanding  convic-
tions. It is interesting to see the connection to what earlier, we called
the “ability to tolerate ambiguity”: While conceptually, “certainty”
involves “knowing that one knows” (or maximal epistemic precision),
on a purely formal level describing the underlying brain dynamics,
epistemic precision is the inverse of variability, or the “confidence”
the system places in a source of sensory information about the ex-
ternal  world (Picard &  Friston 2014).  Empirical  research suggests
that it is the functional role of the anterior insula to signal uncer-
tainty, the fact “that there is something we do not understand” (Pi-
card 2013, p. 2497). The representation of uncertainty and ambigu-
ity, in turn, causes an aversive affective state, often involving feelings
of discomfort and anxiety of the type we continuously try to minim-
ize. By contrast, direct electrical stimulation of a small area in the
anterior-dorsal insula causes intense feelings of bliss (Picard et al.
2013), and it has been suggested that such blissful states, if occur-
ring in the context of epileptic seizures, are associated with maxim-
ized coherence of the phenomenal self-model (PSM; Metzinger 2003).
Subjectively,  this  coherence  is  expressed  by  a  dramatically
heightened  sense  of  self,  by an  intense  phenomenal  experience  of
presence, integratedness, harmony with the world, plus intense posit-
ive affect (for five case reports, see Picard & Craig 2009). For human
beings, ambiguity is not easy to tolerate, because it presents a con-
stant threat to the coherence of our PSM, and cultivating such toler-
ance requires developing the functional ability to de-identify from the
aversive affective states and the “epistemic anxiety” that automatic-
ally accompanies them. Tolerance of ambiguity, it seems, demands
courage and a specific form of choiceless awareness.
plausibility is that, because of their phenomenal
character,  they  prevent  open-minded  inquiry.
Intuitions  turn us into inner  dogmatists.  And
this is true not only for individual propositions
held to be intuitively true, but also for contin-
ued adherence to theoretical claims about the
status of intuitions as a guide to or even as the
basis  of  knowledge  and  genuine  insight.  The
phenomenal character of intuitions even predis-
poses us towards certain meta-theoretical intu-
itions about the general epistemic status of in-
tuitions,  and  we  can  see  the  marks  of  this
throughout the history of philosophy as well as
in  contemporary  debate  (e.g.,  Bealer 1998;
Chudnoff 2013).  The  analysis  of  intuition
clearly should not itself be driven by intuitions.
Instead,  this  is  a  prime example of  where an
open mind is needed.
Our own account starts out from the as-
sumption that intuitions are a specific class of
phenomenal  states.  Human  beings  can  direct
their introspective attention toward the content
of the relevant states and, at least partly and
under  certain  conditions,  report  on  it.  Many
higher animals very likely also possess intuitions
even if they are not able to directly attend to or
verbally  report  on  their  intentional  contents.
Before the evolution of biological nervous sys-
tems and before the emergence of phenomenal
consciousness,  no  intuitions  existed  on  our
planet. Patients in coma or human beings in un-
conscious, dreamless sleep have no intuitions in
the sense intended here. At the same time, intu-
itions  probably  have  a  long  evolutionary  his-
tory: there must have been a point in time at
which the first intuition appeared in the mind
of  some  conscious  organism  and  this  specific
type of inner state then propagated itself across
thousands  of  generations  while  its  functional
profile became ever more differentiated. Plaus-
ibly, one could describe the having of intuitions
as an ability—a mental ability that was adapt-
ive and that was acquired gradually. 
If one takes the phenomenal character of
intuitions seriously, this ability clearly seems to
be an epistemic ability: prima facie, to have an
intuition means to have the subjective experi-
ence of knowing something, directly and imme-
diately,  without  necessarily  being  able  to  ex-
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open MIND?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(GI). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 7 | 28
www.open-mind.net
press this knowledge linguistically or to provide
an epistemic  justification.  Typically,  inner  ex-
perience seems to present knowledge to the sub-
ject of experience, even if  one does not know
how and  why one possesses this knowledge. In-
tuitions are the phenomenal signature of know-
ing,  a  seemingly  direct  form  of  “seeing”  the
truth. As soon as we ascribe epistemic status to
intuitions on the basis of their phenomenology
alone,  however,  we commit  the E-error.  “Epi-
stemicity”, the phenomenal quality of “insight”
and “comprehension”, or the feeling of being a
knowing self, as such is only a phenomenal qual-
ity,  just  as  redness,  greenness,  and  sweetness
are.  One  well-known  philosophical  problem is
that the phenomenological and epistemological
readings can always come apart, because what
phenomenologically appears as a kind of percep-
tion could really be a hallucination or an illu-
sion.  Subjectively  indistinguishable  mental
states  do  not  necessarily  have  the  same  epi-
stemic status. Trivially, the difference between
veridical  perception  and  hallucination  (in  the
philosophical  sense;  see  Macpherson 2013;
Crane 2014) is not available on the level of sub-
jective experience itself, and therefore the con-
fusion between phenomenal character and epi-
stemic  content  is  naturally  grounded  in  the
transparent phenomenology, the seeming direct-
ness  and  immediacy  of  the  relevant  kinds  of
phenomenal  states.  The  same  is  true  for  the
phenomenology  of  intuition.  Conflating  epi-
stemic  status  and  phenomenal  character  be-
comes particularly dangerous if  it  is  imported
into theoretical debates, and if the phenomenal
quality in question is that of “epistemicity”, of
direct  and  non-inferential  knowing  itself. The
important lesson is that  as  phenomenal states,
such states are neither necessarily veridical nor
necessarily non-veridical. Experience as such is
not knowledge. As subjective experiences, these
states possess no intentional properties and can-
not be semantically evaluated by concepts like
“truth”  or  “reference”.  Phenomenal  transpar-
ency is not epistemic transparency. 
Many, but not all,  of our philosophically
relevant intuitions are characterized by an addi-
tional element of certainty, of just knowing that
one knows. Here, the phenomenal signature of
knowing does not only refer to the content of
what is seemingly known in a direct, and non-
inferential  manner,  but  to  our  higher-order,
subjectively-experienced  knowledge  itself.  This
means that the phenomenal character of ”epi-
stemicity”  that  accompanies  and  tags  the  re-
spective mental content as an instance of know-
ing has itself become transparent. Its represent-
ational character is not introspectively available
anymore: the fact that epistemicity is itself the
content of a non-conceptual mental representa-
tion, that it is internally constructed and always
contains the possibility of misrepresentation, is
veiled by an experience of immediacy. Transpar-
ency is a special form of darkness. Something
constructed is experienced as a datum, as some-
thing given. Therefore, in stable intuition states
we not only experience the first-order content as
directly given, but the epistemicity of the state
itself. Let us call such states  intuitions of cer-
tainty. Referring to G. E. Moore5 one might say
that the phenomenal signature of knowing has
itself  become  diaphanous  or  transparent:  ac-
cording  to  my  own  subjective  experience,  I
simply know that I know, and the possibility of
error and falsehood is not given on the level of
conscious experience itself. From the fact that a
conscious  perception  instantiates  the  phenom-
enal  quality  of  “greenness”  it  does  not  follow
that the underlying process or even the percep-
tual object are green. The same is true for the
“phenomenal signature of knowing” that charac-
terizes intuitions.
Intuitiveness  is  a  property  of  theoretical
claims or arguments, relative to a class of rep-
resentational systems exhibiting a specific func-
tional architecture. Conscious human beings are
one example of such a class. The brains of hu-
man beings are naturally evolved information-
processing systems, and when engaging in expli-
cit, high-level cognition they use specific repres-
entational  formats  and  employ  characteristic
5 In The Refutation of Idealism, G. E. Moore wrote: “The term ‘blue’
is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have
called ‘consciousness’—that which a sensation of blue has in common
with a sensation of green—is extremely difficult to fix. […] And in
general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems
to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—
we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be con-
vinced that  there  is  something,  but  what  it  is  no  philosopher,  I
think, has yet clearly recognized” (1903, p. 446).
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styles of processing. Whenever we try to com-
prehend a certain theory, an argument or a spe-
cific  philosophical  claim,  our  brains  construct
an internal model of this theory, argument, or
claim (Johnson-Laird 1983, 2008; Knauff 2009).
This mostly automatic process of constructing
mental  models  of  theories  possesses  a  phe-
nomenology of its own: some theories just “feel
right”  because  they  elicit  subtle  visceral  and
emotional responses, some claims “come easily”,
they are experienced as sound and healthy, and
some arguments (including the implicit assump-
tions upon which they rely)  seem “just  plain
natural”.  Some  forms  of  skepticism  appear
“healthy”  to  us,  while  others  do  not—there
seems to be a deep connection between sanity
and reason.
There may be two overarching reasons for
this well-known fact. First, theories that are in-
tuitively  plausible  exhibit  a  high  degree  of
“goodness of fit” in regard to our network of ex-
plicit prior convictions. More generally, they op-
timally satisfy the constraints provided by our
conscious and unconscious models of reality as a
whole. These microfunctional constraints impli-
citly represent both the totality of  the know-
ledge we have acquired during our lifetime and
certain  assumptions  about  the  deep  causal
structure of the world that proved functionally
adequate for our biological ancestors. Theories
that  immediately  feel  good  because  they  are
characterized by a high degree of intuitiveness
maximize a specific  kind of  internal harmony.
What we introspectively detect is a high degree
of consistency, but in a non-linguistic, subsym-
bolic medium. Therefore we could also replace
the term “intuitiveness” with a notion like “in-
tuitive soundness” or “introspectively detected
consistency  or  goodness  of  fit”  (relative  to  a
preexisting  model  of  reality).  In  principle  it
should be possible to spell out this point on a
mathematical level, by describing the underly-
ing neural computations and their properties in
a connectionist  framework, or by utilizing the
conceptual tools provided by dynamical systems
theory or predictive coding.
A second perspective might be to look at
intuitions  not  from  a  representationalist,  but
from biophysical perspective. We are embodied
beings, and there are different levels of embodi-
ment  (Metzinger 2014).  Computational,  but
also  thermodynamical  imperatives  guide  the
self-organization  of  representational  states  in
our brains. One major causal factor underlying
the  conscious  experience  of  “intuitive  sound-
ness“ might simply be the amount of energy it
takes to activate and sustain a mental model of
a  given  theory,  plus  the  amount  of  energy  it
would take to permanently integrate this theory
into our pre-existing model of reality. Our men-
tal space of intuitive plausibility can in principle
be  described  as  an  energy  landscape:  claims
that “come easily” do so because they allow us
to reach a stable state quickly and easily, theor-
ies that “feel good” are theories that can be ap-
propriated  without  a  high  demand  of  energy.
Theories that don’t feel good have the opposite
characteristics: they “don’t add up”, they “just
don’t compute”, because they endanger our in-
ternal harmony and functional coherence, and it
would take a lot of energy to permanently integ-
rate them into our overall mental model of real-
ity. They are costly. In a biophysical system like
the human brain there may well be a direct con-
nection between thermodynamic efficiency and
reduction of complexity on the level of informa-
tion processing. If biological self-organization in-
volves  continuously  minimizing  the  prediction
errors  generated  by  the  flow  of  “hypotheses”
originating in the brain’s current model of real-
ity, then the process that creates what today we
call  our  deepest  “theoretical  intuitions”  may
also be described as such an attempt to reduce
variational  free  energy.  While  on  a  more  ab-
stract level this process can be said to minimize
representational  complexity  while  simultan-
eously maximizing the evidence for the overall
model, it is also a physical process that is not
guided by abstract rationality constraints, but
simply one that optimizes metabolic and statist-
ical efficiency at the same time (Sengupta et al.
2013; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013). 
We need an open mind, because many of
the best future theories about the human mind
and conscious  experience  may just  “not  com-
pute” for beings like us. However, what does or
does not compute is, in part, a contingent fact
determined by the functional architecture of our
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brain, shaped by millions of years of biological
evolution on this planet, as well as—to a much
lesser  degree—by our individual  cognitive his-
tory and a given cultural/linguistic context. The
phenomenology of intuitive soundness—the fact
that some arguments seem “just natural”—is a
biological phenomenon that is additionally sup-
ported by a short cultural history of cognitive
niche construction. In this framework, the space
of intuitive plausibility reflects exactly those as-
pects  of  our  evolutionary  history  and  of  our
more recent cognitive niche that have become
transparent—that we have long ceased to exper-
ience as evolved and culturally driven, but re-
gard as unconstructed, immediate, and even in-
dubitable.  Importantly, the inner landscape of
our space of intuitive plausibility is not simply
contingent on our evolutionary history and on
certain physical and functional properties of our
brains—it  was  optimized  for  functional  ad-
equacy only. This process of optimization serves
to maximize reproductive success and to sustain
an organism’s coherence and physical existence,
but this does not mean that the content of intu-
itions is epistemically justified in any way. This
is especially true because the evolved functional
adequacy of intuitions applies to everyday ac-
tion in practical contexts and ancestral environ-
ments—not to abstract reflection in theoretical
contexts or cognitive environments. This is why
searching for a comprehensive theory of the con-
scious mind presents such a major challenge to
our intellectual honesty: it demands that we in-
vestigate a claim even if it contradicts our deep-
est  intuitions,  even if  it  cries  out  for  a  more
moderate,  weaker  version  because  it  just
“doesn’t  compute”  and  somehow  seems  “just
too  radical”,  costly,  painful  or  even  self-dam-
aging. In this view, any philosophical methodo-
logy that just tries to make our “deepest intu-
itions” explicit in a conceptually coherent man-
ner appears to be a rather trivial enterprise. If
our claims here are correct, then intuition-mon-
gering may even border on intellectual dishon-
esty. At best, it just charts our intuition space;
at worst, it confuses failures of imagination with
insights  into  conceptual  necessity  (“philo-
sopher’s syndrome”, according to Dennett 1991,
p. 401).
3.2 Suspending judgment, inner quietude,
and the phenomenology of uncertainty
If  intuitions  can  be  described  as  creating  a
transparent inner bias and perhaps even as in-
volving an inner form of  dogmatism, then we
might, it would seem, make progress in under-
standing open mindedness as a mental state by
looking to cases characterized by the phenom-
enal  signature  of  not knowing  and  of  uncer-
tainty. The philosophical tradition of skepticism
seems to be a promising place to look. Skepti-
cism comes in many different strengths and fla-
vors (see  Landesman 2002 for a comprehensive
introduction),  but  what  is  distinctive  about
philosophical  skepticism  is  perhaps  best  cap-
tured  by  the  meaning  of  the  original  Greek
term, where skeptic (related to the Greek verb
sképtomai) refers, quite simply, “to one who in-
quires into the truth of things or wishes to gain
knowledge about some subject matter” (Landes-
man & Meeks 2003, p. 1). Skeptical inquiry, in
the  philosophical  sense,  is  not  so  much  con-
cerned  with  the  truth  of  particular  beliefs  or
theoretical  claims  as  with  the  possibility  of
knowledge and certainty in a more fundamental
sense. It also does not always aim at denying
the truth of our most basic beliefs by construing
outlandish  skeptical  hypotheses  such  as  the
Cartesian evil genius. Generally, skeptical argu-
ments cast doubt on commonly (and often im-
plicitly and unreflectively) accepted means for
attaining knowledge—and in so doing frequently
give rise to new and fruitful discussions on how
our  epistemic  practices  might  be  improved.
Throughout  the  history  of  philosophy,  skepti-
cism,  at  its  best,  has  often  been  deeply  con-
structive and has enabled genuine progress. 
The philosophical tradition that has per-
haps  been  most  concerned  with  cultivating  a
skeptical attitude and with uncertainty and not-
knowing as a mental state, at least in Western
philosophy, is Pyrrhonian skepticism, which was
one of the two major schools of skepticism in
antiquity. Here, we want to tentatively suggest
that it could be instructive to trace many of the
aspects  that  we  claim  characterize  open
mindedness all the way back to the Pyrrhonian
skeptics. This claim might strike some as sur-
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prising, because Pyrrhonian skepticism is often
seen as a particularly radical and excessive kind
of skepticism (Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Hu-
man  Understanding  is  a  classical  example  of
this).  It  is  fair  to  say  that  in  contemporary
philosophy,  Pyrrhonian  skeptics  are  an  en-
dangered species  (for an introduction, see  Fo-
gelin 1994;  Sinnott-Armstrong 2004; especially
Stroud 2004;  Fogelin 2004), with the tradition
often  being  regarded  as  a  bit  of  a  historical
oddity. This is fueled by what little is known of
its founding father, Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 to c.
270 BCE). Most of this is anecdotal, as Pyrrho
wrote nothing himself (Bett 2014). Diogenes, for
instance, tells us that Pyrrho:
led a life consistent with this doctrine, going
out of his way for nothing, taking no pre-
caution, but facing all risks as they came,
whether carts, precipices, dogs, or what not,
and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbit-
rage of his sense; but he was kept out of
harm’s way by his friends, who […] used to
follow close after him. (1943, 9.62) 
Pyrrho  did  not  return  the  favor,  reportedly
passing by an acquaintance who had fallen into
a slough without offering him any help (ibid.,
9.63).  Clearly,  this is  a far cry from the con-
structive and research-generating type of open
mindedness we hope to promote here. 
A more thoughtful and differentiated ac-
count  can  be  found  in  Sextus Empiricus’s
(1987) treatment of skepticism, where he refers
solely to Pyrrhonian skepticism.6 According to
Sextus:
Skepticism  is  an  ability,  or  mental  atti-
tude, which opposes appearances to judg-
ments  in  any  way  whatsoever,  with  the
result  that,  owing to the equipollence of
the objects and reasons thus opposed, we
are  brought  firstly  to  a  state  of  mental
suspense  and next  to  a  state  of  ‘unper-
turbedness’ or quietude. (1987, Chapter 4)
6 Sextus distinguishes three types of philosophers by their adherence
to different types of systems: dogmatists, or those who claim to have
discovered the truth; academics, who deny that the truth can be ap-
prehended; and skeptics, who continue to inquire. 
Clearly, there is at least a superficial similarity
between  Sextus’s  claim  that  skepticism  is  an
ability and our description of open mindedness
as an epistemic practice. Here, we briefly review
the  most  important  characteristics  of
Pyrrhonian skepticism and argue that there in-
deed  exist  a  number  of  insightful  parallels  to
open mindedness as an epistemic practice. 
A first point is that from the perspective
of Pyrrhonian skepticism, dogmatism is the end
of reasoning and the opposite of philosophical
reflection. At the same time, the anti-dogmat-
ism of the Pyrrhonian skeptics did not prevent
them from giving “assent to the feelings which
are the necessary results of sense-impressions”
(1987,  7.13).  The  Pyrrhonian  skeptics  merely
withheld assent to “the non-evident objects of
scientific inquiry” (ibid., 7.13). As an early form
of  what  we  call  academic  open  mindedness,
Pyrrhonian  skepticism  was  directed,  first  and
foremost, “against the dogmas of ‘Professors’—
not the beliefs of common people pursuing the
honest (or, for that matter, not so honest) busi-
ness of daily life. The Pyrrhonian skeptic leaves
common  beliefs,  unpretentiously  held,  alone.”
(Fogelin 2004, p. 163) 
This suggests that if we want to contrast
the  cultivation  of  an  anti-dogmatic  mindset
with intuitions, this point should be applied not
to intuitions and feelings of certainty in general,
but  to  philosophical  intuitions  in  particular.
Philosophical intuitions,  in virtue of their dis-
tinctive phenomenal character, involve a specific
and often highly-specialized form of inner dog-
matism: they quickly and effortlessly create an
inner bias towards a given theoretical position,
while at the same time making it seem so in-
dubitable and certain as to prevent further crit-
ical inquiry. Even though the terminology is, of
course,  different,  the  Pyrrhonian  attitude  of
anti-dogmatism presents itself as an antidote to
exactly the type of uncritical, judgmental atti-
tude that is the hallmark of intuitions. 
Second,  the  Pyrrhonian  skeptic,  in  his
quest  for  “quietude  in  respect  of  matters  of
opinion  and  moderate  feeling  in  respect  of
things unavoidable” (Sextus 1987, 12.25), makes
use of stereotyped tropes or modes of argument.
The tropes are all very similar in structure, in-
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volving a series of contrasts between opposing
statements, with the aim of leading to irresolv-
able disagreement and inducing a suspension of
judgment.  True to the characterization of  the
Pyrrhonian  skeptic  as  one  who inquires,  “the
modes […] were not designed to inhibit reason-
ing.  Rather,  they  were  designed  to  assist  the
Pyrrhonian in continuing to inquire by shielding
her  from the  disquieting  state  of  dogmatism”
(Klein 2014).  As  Sextus (1987,  7.13)  tells  us,
the  Pyrrhonian,  when  entering  into  a  debate
with the dogmatist,  does not assert  his  argu-
ments in the manner of claiming their truth; in-
stead,  he  asserts  them only  provisionally  and
purely for the sake of argument, enabling him
to practice epoché,  or to bracket  his  assump-
tions about the truth of the relevant proposi-
tions. The tropes, then, are not just a strategy
for  convincing  one’s  opponent,  but  a  specific
way of cultivating this more general kind of epi-
stemic attitude: 
Like  piano  exercises  for  the  fingers  that
would result  in semi-automatic  responses
to the printed notes on a sheet of music,
the  modes  were  mental  exercises  that
would result  in semi-automatic  responses
to claims being made by the dogmatists—
those  who  assented  to  the  non-evident.
(Klein 2014) 
We certainly do not mean to suggest that we
should all become Pyrrhonian skeptics by for-
mulating modernized versions of the tropes. We
only  want  to  point  out  that  the  naturalistic
strategy  of  preparing  and  then  handing  over
questions to scientific research can be viewed as
fulfilling a similar function, namely as cultivat-
ing the epistemic virtues and abilities associated
with open mindedness. This in itself, of course,
is nothing new. A similar idea can be found, for
example, in Russell’s claim that, 
as soon as definite knowledge concerning
any subject becomes possible, this subject
ceases  to  be  called  philosophy,  and  be-
comes a separate science. […] those ques-
tions which are already capable of definite
answers are placed in the sciences,  while
those only to which, at present, no definite
answer can be given, remain to form the
residue which is called philosophy. (Russell
1912/1999, p. 112)
Following Russell, philosophy itself is a specific
variant of cultivating what, earlier, we called a
tolerance of ambiguity, and its value is “to be
sought  largely  in  its  very  uncertainty”  (1912,
113).  The Pyrrhonian tropes are just  one ex-
ample from the history of philosophy of how a
particular style of  argumentation can be used
not just to generate particular insights but also
to promote a particular style of thinking. Ana-
logously, one of the reasons why interdisciplin-
ary collaboration and data-driven arguments in
philosophy are valuable may be that they are a
way of practicing and cultivating open minded-
ness.  Interdisciplinary  research  projects  don’t
just produce new data, but leave their marks on
the minds of the researchers involved as well. 
Third, the suspension of judgment, which
is the outcome and in some sense the aim of the
modes, is described by Sextus as a state of men-
tal rest and as an “untroubled and tranquil con-
dition of the soul” (1987, 4. 10). It also, how-
ever, has a normative dimension, involving the
claim that if there is irresolvable disagreement
between two opposing positions, one should re-
frain from adopting either of them. 
In the ambiguity between these two read-
ings,  there is  a nice point of  contact between
open mindedness as a mental state and some-
thing that today one might call the ethics of be-
lief (Clifford 1877/1999;  Chignell 2010) and of
belief formation. There is clearly a social (Gold-
man 2010) and perhaps even an interdisciplin-
ary dimension of epistemology, both in a theor-
etical and in practical sense. As is the case for
the  dialectical  confrontation  between  the
Pyrrhonian and the dogmatist, progress (in the
sense of suspension of judgment) will often res-
ult from confronting one’s own convictions with
those held by others, as well as from confronting
them with real-world counterexamples.7 By con-
trast,  accumulating  evidence  suggests  that
7 This reliance on actual cases of disagreement, rather than on hypo-
thetical scenarios and thought experiments, is also one of the differ-
ences between Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skepticism.
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merely simulating this process by charting one’s
own intuitive responses to carefully calibrated
thought experiments is not nearly as effective,
and is actually often quite misleading (Gendler
&  Hawthorne 2010;  Alexander 2012;  Dennett
2013). Doing, as the Pyrrhonian skeptics real-
ized, is better than merely imagining. 
Indeed,  empirical  evidence  suggests  that
our  natural  confidence  in  naïve  realism  is  so
strong that it remains largely unscathed by the-
oretical evidence to the contrary. In one study,
when participants read a text about cognitive
limitations and biases, this did not affect their
confidence in their own social judgments. Con-
fidence  levels  were  only  significantly  reduced
when  theoretical  challenges  to  naïve  realism
were presented alongside specific examples, such
as visual illusions. As the authors put it, “ac-
knowledging susceptibility to bias […] may not
always  translate  to  actually  tempering  one’s
confidence or expressing an openness to change.
Instead, experiencing unconscious cognition and
bias  was  required  to  reduce  confidence  and
closed-mindedness” (Hart et al. 2015, 6). This
acknowledgment  of  the  value  of  the  practical
and experiential dimensions of suspending judg-
ment is implicit in the Pyrrhonian tropes.
Fourth, ataraxia, or quietude, according to
Sextus, automatically and effortlessly follows on
the heels of the suspense of judgment. This un-
intentional character of quietude is important,
because it means not only that quietude cannot
be actively brought about, but also that it is
found in  a  place  quite  different  from that  in
which one was looking: 
the  Skeptics  were  in  hopes  of  gaining
quietude by means of a decision regarding
the disparity of the objects of sense and of
thought,  and being  unable  to  effect  this
they suspended judgment; and they found
that  quietude,  as  if  by  chance,  followed
upon their suspense, even as a shadow fol-
lows  its  substance.  (Sextus Empiricus
1987, 12.29)
This mental quietude may well be the phenom-
enal  signature  of  not-knowing  and  of  uncer-
tainty,  coupled with a highly developed toler-
ance of ambiguity; and it may be intimately re-
lated to the ability to formulate a question or
identify a problem while refraining from giving
a solution. 
What we can see now, especially by con-
trasting this point with what we said about in-
tuitions earlier,  is  how mental quietude might
be  turned  into  a  target  for  consciousness  re-
search in its own right, perhaps even forming a
new branch of the psychology or cognitive neur-
oscience of interdisciplinarity. In particular, the
mental state cultivated by the Pyrrhonian skep-
tics is diametrically opposed to that involved in
intuitions.  Both  are  phenomenal  states  only,
and as such have no intrinsic epistemic warrant.
However, where intuitions block further inquiry,
mental quietude and the phenomenology of un-
certainty  promote  it.  The  skeptic  aims,  in  a
sense, at a state in which inquiry has become
permanent.
But there is also an important difference.
Whereas  intuitions  and  intuitive  plausibility
come  to  us  naturally  and  effortlessly,  open
mindedness, the suspension of judgment and the
tolerance of ambiguity are the result of careful
cultivation,  long-term  practice,  and  sustained
effort. From a purely evolutionary perspective,
uncertainty and a non-judgmental attitude are
costly  and  perhaps  even  dangerous,  because
they do not motivate action in the same imme-
diate, quick, and unreflected way as intuitions.8
8 In fact, if doubt has an evolutionary function, it might be to prohibit
activity and induce rest in situations in which the benefits of phys-
ical activity are outweighed by its risks, for instance in illness. Doubt
and certainty of the theoretical sort may have more distinctly bodily
precursors; they may be different ways of regulating how we relate to
our own bodies and gauge our own level of physical ability.  Carel
(2013)  describes  bodily  certainty  as  involving  a  tacit  confidence
“that our bodies will continue to function in a similar fashion to the
way they have functioned in the past: we expect our stomachs to di -
gest the lunch we have just eaten, our brains to continue to process
information, our eyes to continue to see, and so on” (ibid. p. 4). By
contrast, bodily doubt involves a breakdown of our beliefs about our
own bodily capacities, but also a disruption on the level of subjective
experience. “Bodily doubt is a physical sensation of doubt and hesit-
ation arising in one’s body. It is not solely cognitive, although it can
be expressed in propositions. […] Bodily doubt not only changes the
content of experience, it also pierces the normal sense of bodily con-
trol, continuity, and transparency in a way that reveals their contin-
gency. It shows our tacit faith in our own bodies to be a complex
structure that becomes visible when it is disturbed. It changes the
normal experience of continuity, transparency, and trust that charac-
terize this structure” (ibid. p. 11). Bodily doubt is often associated
with physical illness and depression, and in some cases, it seems this
form of experiencing our own physical vulnerability may have a pro-
tective function. But according to Carel, the analysis of bodily doubt
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If on encountering a bear in the wilderness you
take too much time to contemplate the nature
of the threat (or to question your intuitive as-
sessment that the bear is indeed a threat), you
might be eaten before you come to a conclusion.
Cleary,  introducing  the  Pyrrhonian  spirit  to
such  practical,  everyday  situations  is  absurd
and  perhaps  even  unhealthy.  However,  in  the
context  of  philosophical  and scientific  inquiry,
cultivating  vulnerability  of  the  epistemic  type
(cf.  Chinnery 2014)  might  be  a  strength  and
might help prepare the ground for genuine col-
laboration  and fruitful  discourse.  But  we  can
now also understand why, even in science, open
mindedness is  so frustratingly difficult to sus-
tain: mental quietude is not a state of passivity
or mental inertia. It is a mental ability that re-
quires constant alertness and a lifetime of prac-
tice. 
3.3 Acknowledging the problem of 
subjectivity
If open mindedness indeed draws from the same
ideals as are rooted in Pyrrhonian skepticism,
how can we put these insights to work in invest-
igating  phenomenal  states  and  tackling  the
problem of subjectivity? In contemporary philo-
sophy of mind, the problem of subjectivity is of-
ten taken to be the main conceptual and meth-
odological  obstacle  for  a  true  science  of  the
mind. Can the first-person perspective be nat-
uralized?  What,  exactly,  is  the  place  of  sub-
jectivity  in  the  scientific  world-view?  And  is
there really something like “first-person data”
that can—and perhaps must—enter the process
of constructing a truly comprehensive theory of
the conscious mind? Questions of this kind are
also illuminates the extent to which we are normally guided by a ta-
cit and unshakeable kind of bodily certainty that typically cannot be
rejected or rationally justified and that forms part of our brute an-
imal nature. If this is right, then it might also explain why even the
more abstract and theoretical variants of certainty continue to be as-
sociated with health and strength on the level of subjective experi-
ence—even though this confidence can be epistemically misleading.
This also fits in nicely with the claim, elaborated in footnote 4, that
ambiguity threatens the perceived coherence of the phenomenal self-
model, whereas certainty, on the level of subjective experience, ap-
pears to be associated with heightened self-awareness. We might now
say that doubt and the tolerance of ambiguity are an acquired taste:
while in their early stages, they are often associated with discomfort
or even anxiety,  their cultivation may also be the key to genuine
peace of mind.
good  examples  of  high-level  theoretical  issues
that  require  the  epistemic  virtues  associated
with an open mind. Even the editors of this col-
lection  have  a  tendency  to  disagree  on  this
question—and we hope that this disagreement
is of a constructive sort.
One  of  us  (TM)  thinks  that  a  greater
practical  openness  to  so-called  “first-person
methods” on the part of  researchers  in  philo-
sophy and cognitive science alike might lead to
great  heuristic  fecundity  and  would,  perhaps
dramatically, improve the quality and efficiency
of research. Many such methods can be seen as
the cultivation of a set of abilities that increase
mental  autonomy  (M-autonomy;  Metzinger
2013b, 2013d) and establish the inner precondi-
tions for critical, rational thought: by stabilizing
the first-person perspective, they create a more
robust  “epistemic  agent  model”  (EAM;  Met-
zinger 2013a, Box 1;  Metzinger 2013d), or the
experience of being a knowing self. At the same
time he holds that there simply are no “first-
person data” in any strict or conceptually more
rigorous sense. Seriously assuming the existence
of such data rests on an extended usage of a
concept  that  is  only  well-defined  in  another
(namely,  scientific)  context.  First,  the  whole
concept of a “first-person perspective” is just a
visuo-grammatical metaphor, without a theory
to back it up—and currently we simply don’t
know  what  that  could  be,  namely  what  “a”
first-person  perspective would look like (for  a
first  conceptual  differentiation,  see  Metzinger
2003, 2004; Blanke & Metzinger 2009). Second,
“data” are extracted from the physical world by
technical  measuring devices, in a  public proced-
ure that  is  well-defined  and  well-understood,
replicable, and improvable; and which is neces-
sarily  intersubjective.  But in introspecting our
own minds we never have any truly direct or
immediate access to a mysterious class of “sub-
jective facts”—all we have are neural correlates
and publicly observable reports (which need not
be verbal). Speaking of “first-person data” rests
on an extended usage of a concept that is only
well-defined in another context of  application,
rhetorically exploiting a fallacy of equivocation.
“Data”  are  typically  (though  not  always)
gathered with the help of technical measuring
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devices  (and  not  individual  brains)  and  by
groups of people who mutually control and cri-
ticize  each  other’s  methods  of  data-gathering
(namely,  by  large  scientific  communities).  In
particular, data are gathered in the context of
rational theories aiming at ever better predic-
tions, theories that—as opposed to phenomeno-
logical reports—are open to falsification.
To be sure, autophenomenological reports,
theory-contaminated as they may be, are them-
selves  highly  valuable  and  can  certainly  be
treated as data. But the experience “itself” can-
not.  However,  even  if  one  presupposes  this
rather  straightforward  view,  having  an  open
mind  certainly  also  means  acknowledging  the
additional  fact  that,  for  various  reasons,  this
cannot be the whole story. It would be intellec-
tually dishonest to deny without argument that
what is sometimes called “first-person methods”
could have enormous potential in our quest for
a rigorous, empirically based theory of the hu-
man mind.  The question  rather  is:  What ex-
actly is it about these methods that generates
the extra epistemic value, if there really is one?
It seems clear that not all epistemic virtues are
intellectual virtues,  and  it  is  striking  to  note
how such methods have played a central role in
all cultures and in almost all ancient philosoph-
ical traditions of humankind. This is not only
true  for  Asian  systems  of  philosophy.  At  the
very  beginning  of  Western  philosophy,  Cicero
(1971), in the  Tusculanae disputationes (II 5),
defined philosophy itself as  cultura animi, as a
way of caring for and cultivating the soul.
The  other  (JW)  thinks  that  first-person
data exist,  and that for a true science of  the
mind, of consciousness and of subjectivity, it is
important to acknowledge their existence. First-
person data are not,  however,  to be found in
the direct observation of conscious experience—
thus far JW and TM are in perfect agreement—
but in describing and more properly in report-
ing it. A first step towards seeing why this is
the case is to clearly distinguish first-person re-
ports from general opinions, convictions, or even
intuitions  about  experience.  First-person  re-
ports, in this view, are the product of (verbal or
non-verbal)  behaviors conducted with the sin-
cere intent of conveying or recording certain rel-
evant  information about a specific  experience.
They are not mere opinions about what it  is
typically like for oneself to have a certain kind
of experience. They also should not be confused
with attempts to generalize from one’s own case
to what it is typically like for other people to
undergo a given type of experience, or with the
practice, occasionally found in academic philo-
sophy of mind, of relying on intuitive judgments
or thought experiments to reach general conclu-
sions about the necessary or even typical char-
acteristics of given types of experience. 
First-person reports,  construed as sincere
descriptions  of  specific  and  individual  experi-
ences, form the data-base of scientific conscious-
ness research. They can be gathered with the
help of public methods such as standardized in-
terview  techniques  or  questionnaires,  and  the
data obtained from these reports are open to in-
tersubjective  validation  (e.g.,  by  using  inde-
pendent raters, different methods of statistical
analysis and of scoring the content of reports,
and  so  on).  At  the  same  time,  this  strategy
works only against a background of trust that
first-person  reports  can,  when gathered under
sufficiently  ideal  reporting  conditions,  be  re-
garded as trustworthy with respect to the spe-
cific experiences they purport to describe. In-
deed, assuming at least a subgroup of first-per-
son  reports  to  be  trustworthy  is  a  necessary
condition of possibility for scientific conscious-
ness  research,  for  methodological  reasons  (see
Windt 2013, 2015).9
Much of  the  serious  work,  in  this  view,
will consist in identifying and improving the ap-
propriate conditions under which maximally ac-
curate experience reports can be obtained. Seen
in this manner, the trustworthiness of first-per-
9 Clearly, this is not to say that such reports, or the data obtained
from their analysis, are trustworthy with respect, for instance, to the
neural underpinnings of the respective experiences, and we should
not expect them to be. First-person reports, when gathered under
ideal reporting conditions, are trustworthy with respect to the phe-
nomenal character of experience only. Moreover, because this type of
phenomenological information cannot be gleaned, for instance, from
neuroimaging data, first-person data obtained from the analysis of
experience  reports  necessarily  complement  third-person  data.  As
dream researchers Tore Nielsen & Philippe Stenstrom (2005, p. 1289)
put it, “[i]n an era of high-resolution brain imaging, similarly high-
resolution reports of dream imagery may be needed”. A true science
of consciousness will draw from different methodologies and different
ways of measuring experience, and it will strive to integrate different
types of data and different levels of description. 
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son reports becomes, to a considerable degree, a
methodological problem for empirical research,
not  a  principled  philosophical  or  conceptual
one, and the contribution of philosophy consists,
at best, in showing why this is the case (again,
see  Windt 2013; for critical discussion, see  So-
lomonova et al. 2014). By contrast, principled
distrust in first-person reports, or even the at-
tempt to investigate the phenomenology of ex-
perience independently of first-person reports, is
an obstacle to a true science of consciousness. 
While  we,  the  editors,  may disagree on
the  trustworthiness  and  epistemic  status  of
first-person reports or even on the existence of
first-person data in a strict sense, we certainly
agree about the need to take our own subject-
ive  experience  seriously,  and  we  also  agree
that  the  epistemic  stance  we  call  “open
mindedness” may well include a need to cultiv-
ate familiarity with our own subjective experi-
ence. In this respect, our accounts may well be
complementary. Readers familiar with contem-
plative  traditions  may  also  have  noted  that
there is  a surprisingly direct and often quite
literal correspondence between many classical
notions  such  as  “withholding  judgment”,
“mental  quietude”,  or  “ataraxia”,  and  the
practical  instructions  given  by  meditation
teachers around the world, from different peri-
ods  and  different  non-Western  systems  of
philosophy. These notions are not only theor-
etical  concepts—they  draw  our  attention  to
the fact that there is more than one type of
epistemic practice, and that open mindedness
may in part be constituted by the set of abilit-
ies that connects them (Metzinger 2013c). On
a more theoretical level, to have an open mind
again means to acknowledge (and not repress)
the fact  that  there  may actually  be a  deep,
unresolved ambiguity here,  between the need
to take subjective experience seriously and the
suspension  of  judgment.  In  fact,  bracketing
one’s own folk-psychological or intuitive judg-
ments  about  experience  is  part  of  what  it
takes  to  move  towards  a  truly  scientific  ap-
proach  to  subjective  experience.  For  this
reason,  open  mindedness  involves  cultivating
not  only  a  particular  attitude  towards  one’s
beliefs, but also towards oneself as a believer.
A similar tolerance of ambiguity is at play
in the attitude of lending equal credence to re-
ports  from  different  subjects,  acknowledging
inter-  and  intrasubjective  variation  in  experi-
ence, and, ultimately, trying to integrate these
reports into a maximally large data-base, while
resisting the pull of generalizing from one’s own
case  or  engaging  in  armchair  phenomenology
(where this involves pumping intuitions about
experience rather than carefully observing and
describing what it is like to have particular ex-
periences). We might even say that this strategy
of  stepping  back  from  one’s  own  convictions
about  experience  and  formulating  questions
about  the  phenomenal  character  or  the  sub-
jectivity  of  experience  is  in  keeping  with  the
Pyrrhonian spirit: both are directed at academic
disputes  and  assume  commonplace  experience
or  individual  experience  reports  to  be  trust-
worthy, and both strive towards a confrontation
of  theoretical  statements  with  real-world
counterexamples,  with  the  aim  of  ultimately
giving rise to more sophisticated theories.
The issue of subjectivity is an excellent ex-
ample of a persevering problem that comes in
many different  guises  and reappears  on many
different  levels.  Perhaps  there  really  is  some-
thing about the conscious mind that cannot be
explained  reductively,  even  in  principle.  But
searching  for  a  maximally  parsimonious  sci-
entific explanation is a rational research heur-
istic, not an ideology. It should never be a sub-
stitute for religion, and as such it carries it with
it no immediate metaphysical commitments. To
have  an  open  mind  is  an epistemic stance,
which  means  that  epistemic  progress  is  what
counts in the end. Many of the authors in this
collection,  including  the  editors,  are  staunch
methodological  naturalists,  because  they  view
philosophy and science as engaged in essentially
the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and
using  similar  methods.  If  it  could  be  shown,
however, more precisely than ever before in the
history of philosophy and science, that there are
strictly irreducible aspects of the human mind,
then most of the authors in this collection, and
indeed most researchers in this field, would be
satisfied with this result. They would have what
they wanted all along: epistemic progress.
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4 The wider context
Having an open mind means never losing sight of
the bigger picture and being continuously aware
that scientific research, including research on the
mind, is embedded in a wider context. In what
follows,  we  will  very  briefly  draw attention  to
three examples of what we mean by the “bigger
picture” and the “wider context”: ethical, anthro-
pological,  and sociocultural  issues;  globalization
and transcultural philosophy; and what we provi-
sionally call  “the sapiential  dimension”—getting
philosophy  back into philosophy.10 Let us begin
with the ethical ramifications of the type of work
presented in this collection.
New theories lead to new technologies and
new potentials  for  action.  Gradually,  they also
change the image of humankind, a fact that may
in  turn  have  major  social  and  cultural  con-
sequences.  Having  an  open  mind  means  being
sensitive to normative issues and ethical aspects
of research in philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. It also means acknowledging the fact that
the human mind is a culturally embedded phe-
nomenon and that what we come to believe about
it  will  eventually change not only sociocultural
practice, but our own minds as well. Such “soft is-
sues” are not empirically tractable, at least not in
any  direct  manner  (Metzinger 2000,  pp.  6–10;
Metzinger 2009).  Here,  perhaps  even  more  so
than elsewhere, the challenge is to formulate the
right kinds of questions in a rigorous, precise, and
fully intelligible manner. These questions are cer-
tainly difficult, but they are also clearly relevant.
4.1 Sensitivity to ethical issues
Theoretical innovation leads to technological in-
novation, necessitating careful and reflected risk
10 Again, this comes back to the classical idea of wisdom as not only know-
ing how to live well, but also succeeding at doing so (Ryan 2014). There
is also a clear connection between open mindedness as an epistemic prac-
tice and its ethical dimension. As  Russell (1912/1999, p. 116) puts it,
“[t]he mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartial-
ity of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same free-
dom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. […] The impar-
tiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the
very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is
that universal love which can be given to all, and not only to those who
are judged useful or admirable”. The true value of philosophy lies not
just in its effects on our thoughts, but on our lives, on our actions; “it
makes us citizens of the universe” (ibid., p. 116).
assessment. For example, modern virtual reality
technology not only enables the concrete realiz-
ation  of  a  large  number  of  new experimental
paradigms, but has also provided us with many
novel and philosophically relevant insights into
the multimodal bodily foundations of selfhood
and subjectivity (Blanke 2012;  Blanke &  Met-
zinger 2009;  Metzinger 2014).  In  combination
with  constantly  improving  brain-computer  in-
terfaces, virtual reality technology also possesses
the potential  for military applications,  for ex-
ample  via  virtual  or  robotic  re-embodiment.
New ways of causally coupling the human-self-
model with avatars and surrogate bodies in vir-
tual  reality  will  have  clinical  benefits  in  the
medical treatment of patients and, perhaps, in
rehabilitation  programs  for  prisoners.  But  it
also opens the door to new forms of consumer
manipulation  and  potentially  unexpected  psy-
chological  side-effects  (e.g.,  Blascovich &  Bai-
lenson 2011).
A second example of the social and polit-
ical  dimension  of  new  action  potentials,  in
terms of how they might intervene in the brain,
is  provided  by  new  developments  in  pharma-
ceutical  cognitive  enhancement  (Merkel et  al.
2007;  Metzinger &  Hildt 2011).  Cognitive en-
hancement  is  a  molecular-level  technology,
which aims to optimize a specific  class  of  in-
formation-processing  functions:  cognitive  func-
tions,  physically realized by the human brain.
The human brain, however, is also embodied as
well as embedded in a dense network of environ-
mental interactions, many of which are of a dis-
tinctly cultural and social  nature. And it  not
only possesses a long evolutionary history, but
also changes over an individual’s lifespan. Here,
the central philosophical problem is that norm-
ative elements are already built into the concept
itself. In bioethics, the term “enhancement” is
“usually used […]  to characterize  interventions
designed to improve human form or functioning
beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore
good health” (Juengst 1998, p. 29). As opposed
to  medical  treatments  or  therapies,  enhance-
ments modify physical or mental characteristics
in  healthy  individuals,  just  like  cosmetic  sur-
gery.  In  psychopharmacological  enhancement,
psychoactive drugs originally devised as therapy
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for specified diseases are typically used off-label
or illicitly by normal, healthy individuals in or-
der to modify brain functioning. In the future,
how exactly can we benefit from scientific pro-
gress, for example by influencing and construct-
ively interacting with the ever-developing neur-
onal architecture of our brains on a molecular
level, while not leaving the social context out of
consideration? 
Who counts as a “healthy individual”? A
trivial but important point is that concepts like
“normal  mental  functioning”  or,  say,  “normal
age-related cognitive decline” possess a statist-
ical and a normative reading. The semantics of
both types of  concepts change over  time.  For
example, the statistical and descriptive features
of “normal mental functioning” or “normal age-
related cognitive decline” change as science pro-
gresses, as the predictive success of our theories
improves, and as textbook definitions are adap-
ted. Our concepts become richer in content and
more  differentiated.  But  if  a  specific  society
suddenly has new tools and new potentials for
action—say, to alter certain cognitive functions
in the elderly—then the statistical distribution
of even those objective properties underlying a
purely  statistical  notion  of  what  is  “normal”
may also  change.  Cognitive  enhancement is  a
neurotechnology,  and  technologies  change  the
objective world. However, objective changes are
also subjectively perceived and may lead to cor-
related shifts in value judgments. Concepts such
as “healthy individual”,  “normal mental  func-
tioning”,  or  “normal  age-related  cognitive  de-
cline”  always  have  a  descriptive  as  well  as  a
normative  reading,  because  they  appear  in
statements about what human beings should be
like.  Is  it  really  necessary  to  succumb  to
memory  loss  or  a  decreasing  attention  span
after the age of 55? If other options are actually
on the table, does this turn passively capitulat-
ing to  age-related  cognitive  decline  or  certain
individual limitations in the ability to engage in
high-level,  abstract  thought  into  a  cognitive
form of unkemptness and dishevelment?
In  this  example,  the  not-so-trivial  chal-
lenge lies in understanding the dynamic interac-
tion  between  “normality”  (in  the  descriptive
sense)  and  “normalization”  (in  the  normative
sense).  The  theoretical  and  social  dynamics
linking both concepts and their interpretation is
highly complex. It involves scientific theories (in
cognitive neuroscience, molecular neurobiology,
and psychopharmacology), applied philosophical
ethics, changing cultural contexts, globalization,
policy-making, as well as industrial lobbies try-
ing to influence the historical change of our very
own  concepts  and  their  meaning  in  order  to
market new products. Normalization is a com-
plex sociocultural process by which certain new
norms become accepted in societal practice. For
this reason, the scientific process, say, of optim-
izing textbook definitions, empirical predictions,
and therapeutical success has a political dimen-
sion as well. It attempts to firmly ground theor-
etical entities such as “normal mental function-
ing” or “normal age-related cognitive decline” in
empirical  data,  but  it  is  also  driven  by  indi-
vidual  career  interests,  influenced  by  funding
agencies,  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  media
coverage, and so on. 
A  third  important  example  of  how  new
ethical issues emerge is presented by the ques-
tion of animal consciousness and animal suffer-
ing. What is the ethics of creating suffering in
non-human species, for example in the scientific
pursuit  of  uniquely  human  epistemic  goals?
Much recent research shows that many animals
are very likely not only conscious, but also self-
conscious and able to suffer (Brown 2015; Boly
et al. 2013;  Edelman &  Seth 2009;  Seth et al.
2005). They represent a frustration of their own
individual preferences on the level of their con-
sciously  experienced  self-model  and  thus  own
their sensory pain. They are also very likely to
be unable to distance themselves from negative
emotions such as fear, anxiety, or depression. In
the light of new and better descriptive theories
of consciousness, classical normative issues such
as animal ethics reappear in a new guise and
with increasing urgency.
Philosophical  questions such as “Who or
what exactly should count as an object of eth-
ical consideration?” soon may also become rel-
evant  for  the  applied ethics  of  synthetic  phe-
nomenology, that is, for all research programs in
artificial intelligence that risk or even directly
intend the creation of  phenomenal experience,
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of truly subjective, conscious states in non-bio-
logical  hardware.  “Synthetic  phenomenology”
(SP) was first introduced by J. Scott Jordan in
1998, explicitly paralleling the idea of “synthetic
biology”.11 The possibility of machine conscious-
ness now is not only part of the bigger picture
and the wider context mentioned above, it also
illustrates how theoretical innovation may even-
tually lead to technological innovation and re-
quire a careful assessment of possible risks. For
example,  the  Principle  of Negative  Synthetic
Phenomenology  (Metzinger 2013b,  pp.  2–8)  is
an ethical norm that demands that, in artificial
systems,  we  should  not  risk  the  unexpected
emergence of conscious states belonging to the
phenomenological  category  of  “suffering”  or
even aim at the direct creation of states that
would increase the overall amount of suffering
in the universe. But how exactly are we to un-
pack the logical details of this normative pro-
posal? How does one approach these new types
of questions in a rational and data-driven man-
ner? Machine consciousness, just like VR-tech-
nology,  pharmaceutical  enhancement,  and  an-
imal  suffering  is  another  example  of  a  topic
where a lack of imagination might prove danger-
ous and where an open-minded approach is per-
tinent.
Perhaps one central aspect of this problem
is that in an increasing number of cases we will
not only have to ask, “What is a good action?”
but also,  “What is a good state of conscious-
ness?” Opening, cultivating and further devel-
oping one’s own mind clearly is in the spirit of
not only Cicero, Plato, and the ancients—sys-
tematically  increasing  our  own  mental
autonomy seems to be a common ideal shared
by  many  of  humankind’s  philosophical  tradi-
tions. However, the boundary conditions for this
old  philosophical  project  are  beginning  to
change  because  the  tools  for  manipulating  or
11 See Chrisley 2009, p. 68 and Chrisley & Parthemore 2007, note 2. SP
encompasses  a variety of different approaches,  methodologies,  and
disciplines, but what they all have in common is that they see SP as
the construction or guided dynamical self-organization of phenom-
enal  states  in  artificial  systems.  They also  share  the  deep-seated
methodological intuition that any scientific explanation of conscious-
ness necessarily involves a systematic  re-construction  of the target
phenomenon. See  Gamez (2008, pp. 887–910); Holland & Goodman
(2003);  Holland et  al. (2007);  Chrisley &  Parthemore  (2007);
Aleksander (2008) for a first overview.
even systematically cultivating our own minds
are  constantly becoming better—and precisely
as a result of interdisciplinary, empirical work in
the Mind Sciences.  If  we arrive at  a  compre-
hensive theory of consciousness, and if we de-
velop ever more sophisticated tools to alter the
contents of subjective experience, we will have
to think hard about what a  good  state of con-
sciousness  is.  This  again  illustrates  the  point
that  as  some parts  of  neurotechnology inevit-
ably  lead  to  consciousness  technology,  new
normative issues arise and classical  philosoph-
ical questions reappear in new guises (Metzinger
2009).
As  editors  of  this  collection,  we  do  not
want to take a specific position on any of these
important  and highly  controversial  issues.  We
merely want to point out that having an open
mind also means cultivating a specific kind of
sensitivity: a sensitivity for the actual and po-
tential  suffering  of  other  sentient  beings,  for
newly emerging ethical issues and for the obvi-
ous fact that the kind of research we are devel-
oping together does not take place in a political,
social, or cultural vacuum. For example, open
mindedness also requires a self-critical sense of
responsibility to global society as a whole. It is
also in this context that new conceptual bridges
have to be built between artificial intelligence,
cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and
ethics. Once more, a first and important step
may  be  to  carefully  consider  the  questions
themselves, rather than to rush into an answer
or attempt to quickly implement mere techno-
cratic  solutions.  Ultimately,  all  of  these  ques-
tions have a lot to do with the classical philo-
sophical problem of what a good life actually is.
4.2 Globalization and intercultural philosophy
There is not only an ethics of science, there is
also an ethics of globalization. It has to do with
fairness and, for example, the willingness of the
rich to relinquish some of their sovereignty for
the benefits of cooperation. Of course, there are
technical  issues  behind  philosophical  notions
such as “global fairness”. But many would agree
that  we  should  distribute  resources  in  a  way
that helps the worst-off, and that the only way
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of justifying giving more to those members of
humanity  who  are  already  well-off  is  if  it
demonstrably improves the position of those in
the  poorest  and most  dangerous  parts  of  the
world as well. The movement of effective altru-
ism uses scientific research to determine the op-
timal ways of distributing goods to the poorest
regions of the world, with the goal of maximiz-
ing the benefits and long-term efficiency for in-
stance of donations to charities (for general in-
formation,  see  http://www.effectivealtruis-
m.org/).  Such debates  apply to the globaliza-
tion of science and philosophy as well. In this
context, it is interesting (and sobering) to note
how in academic philosophy, the basic idea of
making scholarly work available free of charge
and free of usage restrictions online is vastly un-
derdeveloped in comparison to other fields of re-
search. It is also sobering to note that academic
philosophy, possibly more than other academic
disciplines, continues to be dominated by white,
Western (and mostly Anglo-Saxon) males. This
is not just reflected in philosophy departments
themselves, but also in well-known and widely
consulted ranking systems, which almost exclus-
ively  focus  on  Anglo-Saxon  departments.  We
could do much better here, in all of these re-
spects. Of course, many of us have long realized
this,  and as editors  of  this  collection,  we are
preaching to the choir. What is needed now are
viable ways of changing this situation.
Because of the open access format of the
Open MIND collection, which was conceived of,
in part, as a donation of intellectual property,
we want to focus on one single aspect here. One
might argue that the current subscription-based
publishing system, which comprises nearly all of
the top-ranked journals that young researchers
in particular strive to have on their CVs, is in-
herently  conservative,  stabilizes  the  academic
status quo, and, given the context of academic
globalization plus the urgent need to strengthen
deeper and not just intellectual forms of inter-
cultural exchange, potentially leads to a “global
closed-mindedness”, to a narrowing of intellec-
tual and scholarly life. Typically, publically fun-
ded  academics  will  be  involved  on  different
levels and in different stages of the publication
process, not only as authors, but also as review-
ers, members on editorial boards, editors, and
so on. Indeed, these types of participation are
awarded and often expected by hiring commit-
tees. Yet, despite all of the hours of free labor
(from the perspective of the publishing houses),
the scientific publications that flow out of this
process are often locked behind a paywall, giv-
ing  authors  only  limited  rights  to  distribute
their  own  research.  More  innovative  journals
give  authors  the  opportunity  to  publish  their
papers  open  access—typically  in  return  for  a
hefty publication fee that, once more, is most
likely to be funded by rich universities in afflu-
ent  countries.  Again,  we can,  and should,  do
much better. 
Through their work, scientists and philo-
sophers  continuously  produce  knowledge  and
new intellectual property. However, there exists
not only knowledge production, but also know-
ledge consumption—and the overall process has
an economical basis. How should such goods be
justly distributed? Who can  participate in the
process of producing and consuming them? The
world continues to be divided into “haves” and
“have-nots”  when  it  comes  to  accessing  the
fruits  of  the  intellectual  labor  of  humankind.
The  point  is  not  only  that  taxpayers  should
have access to the results of all publicly funded
work. A more central point is that, given global-
ization, we now need a much more transcultural
type of philosophy. In order to realize this goal,
we urgently need to experiment with different
formats of open access publishing, testing out
what works best. In this way, we could finally
create  a  unified  public  sphere  for  research—a
“global  workspace”  for  the  science  and  philo-
sophy of all humankind. Clearly, this in itself is
not  sufficient,  but  is  a  very  first,  necessary
step.12 Still, the historical transition we are wit-
nessing is one where having an open mind also
12 And new questions continuously arise. Is it, for instance, unethical to
publish one’s research in scientific journals or books that are not open
access and which therefore systematically exclude a large majority of stu-
dents and researchers from the less affluent part of the world? If you an-
swer affirmatively to this question, would you also say that it is unethical
to consume research published in books or journals that are not open ac-
cess? And do you think, in terms of civil disobedience, that it is permiss-
ible to disregard copyrights (and authors’ rights to royalties) to make
such research, either your own or even that of others, openly available?
This is just a small selection of the potentially difficult questions facing
today’s scholars and researchers. And people are already acting upon
their answers (see, for instance, Ludlow 2013).
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means publishing open access whenever possible
—which in no way excludes  additionally  using,
and  paying  for,  traditional  dissemination
formats  as  well.  But  in  creating  humanity’s
global workspace, as Steven Harnad (2007) puts
it, it has now simply become “unethical for the
publishing tail to be allowed to continue to wag
the research dog.” What is needed is an honest
and objective assessment of the most effective
methods of scientific publishing—where effective
not only means cost-efficient from the perspect-
ive  of  large  publishing  houses,  but  also  ad-
dresses  the  dual  challenges  of  optimizing  the
quality  of  research  and  peer-review  processes
while  making scientific  results  available  to all
interested researchers and scholars. 
“Intercultural  philosophy”  may  sound
good—but  what  does  it  really  mean?  Philo-
sophy was born at different places and at differ-
ent times, for example in India, in China, and
in Europe. Philosophical thinking evolved in dif-
ferent cultural contexts that were often quite in-
dependent  of  each  other  and  sometimes  re-
mained  largely  isolated  for  many  centuries.
Globalization now forces us to face the need to
create  novel  forms  of  communication  between
philosophers as well as new forms of coopera-
tion between different traditions and cultures.
Yet  this  development  is  also  an  opportunity.
The  idea  of  “intercultural  philosophy”  is  cer-
tainly  not  new,  and there  are  many different
ways of spelling it out. Here, we want only to
point out that in our view, intercultural philo-
sophy should not be a new academic discipline,
but that it is, again, an attitude, an increasingly
important form of epistemic practice. 
At the same time, not all  philosophical re-
search contexts originally evolved in isolation, and
the globalization of wisdom may be older than we
think.  To give  just  one  familiar  example,  it  is
noteworthy that Pyrrhonian skepticism plausibly
has a strong (and entirely mutual) intercultural
dimension as well. The practice of using standard-
ized arguments involving opposing statements to
cultivate positionlessness, suspension of judgment,
and epoché can be found in the Indian tradition
as well, for instance in the Madhyamaka tradition
and  in  Nagarjuna’s  writings.  Textual  evidence
suggests that not only might Pyrrho himself have
been inspired by ideas with which he came into
contact in India, but also that later, Sextus’s ver-
sion of Pyrrhonian skepticism might have shaped
Nagarjuna’s  Middle  Way  (Dreyfus &  Garfield
2010;  Geldsetzer 2010;  Kuzminski 2008). Having
an open mind, in this sense,  involves not only
bridging disciplinary cultures, but also integrating
different  research  traditions  from  different  cul-
tures and different periods and looking for their
common sources.
Obviously, the open-minded “pooling of in-
tellectual  resources”  that  we  mentioned  above
must  increasingly  also  include  philosophers  not
only  from  Europe  or  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.
From a traditional Western perspective, epistemic
humility  also  means  acknowledging  that  other
philosophical traditions may long ago have had
deep insights into theoretical problems that still
puzzle us today, even if  their knowledge is not
presented in a format and terminology that we
are used to or can easily understand. It would be
intellectually dishonest to assume that the style of
thought  developed  in  Anglo-Saxon  analytical
philosophy is the only way of being intellectually
honest. And obviously, if, as we do, one calls for
an expansion of the principle of charity into inter-
disciplinary discourse, then one should also accept
that  the same principle  applies  to intercultural
collaboration. If there is to be a culture of charity,
then it must be a  global culture of charity—in-
cluding open access publishing and global fairness
in  the  distribution  of  academic  goods.  Today,
even more than in the past, this is another read-
ing of what it means to have an open mind.
4.3 The sapiential dimension
Thanks to the internet and major technological
advances, modern academic life is unfolding at a
greater pace than ever before. It has also become
more competitive than it ever was in the past.
This development bears the promise of progress;
but it also poses a very real risk. As knowledge
production becomes a commodity and academia
is  increasingly  reorganized  based  on  economic
principles of marketing and business administra-
tion, universities are replacing tenure-track lines
with adjunct teachers and a constantly growing
number  of  brilliant  young  academics  are  now
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competing for scarce resources in a globalized aca-
demic environment. The acceleration of academic
life as well as increased social pressure are begin-
ning to have psychological effects on individual
researchers as well. A recent surge in the detec-
tion of fraud and scientific misconduct may be a
sign  of  underlying  counterproductive  incentives
that  have  begun  to  influence  scientists  world-
wide. According to a report in the journal Nature,
published retractions in scientific journals have in-
creased by around 1,200% over the past decade,
even though the number of published papers grew
only  44%  in  the  same  period  (Van Noorden
2011). A detailed review of all 2,047 biomedical
and  life-science  research  articles  indexed  by
PubMed as retracted by the 3rd of May, 2012 re-
vealed that only 21.3% of retractions were attrib-
utable to error (Fang et al. 2012). 67.4% of re-
tractions were attributable to misconduct, includ-
ing fraud or suspected fraud (43.4%), duplicate
publication (14.2%), and plagiarism (9.8%). It is
also possible, however, that the rising number of
retractions  has  been  caused  by  a  growing
propensity to retract flawed and fraudulent pa-
pers and does not in fact involve a substantial in-
crease in  the prevalence of  misconduct  (Fanelli
2013). These numbers might therefore also sug-
gest  an  increasing  willingness  to  retract  faulty
publications. They might also be artefacts of an
increased availability of data on such retractions.
We do not know what the final interpretation of
such data should be. But we do regard them as
one potential indicator of overheated competition
turned counterproductive. 
In philosophy, there is a high and continu-
ously  growing  pressure  for  specialization,  and
this  historical  development  presents  a  major
problem.  One  classical  model  of  what  philo-
sophy is says that philosophers are “specialists
for the general”, who are concerned with integ-
rating the knowledge of their time into an over-
arching  conceptual  model.  As  one  German
idealist  philosopher  put  it,  philosophy  “is  its
own time comprehended in  thought”.13 Today,
the realization of this metaphilosophical vision
has long become an impossible task for even the
13 Hegel, in his preface to the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed.
Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
greatest scholar. The sheer number of publica-
tions in any given, specialized area of research—
such as embodied cognition, self-consciousness,
or the evolution of culture and complex societ-
ies—has  become  so  large  that  it  is  now  ex-
tremely difficult for any ambitious young philo-
sopher to even get an overview of the field. At
the  research  frontier,  great  progress  has  been
made in  the  fine-grained  differentiation  of  re-
search questions, while conceptual precision, ar-
gumentational  density,  and  the  general  speed
with which technical debates are conducted is
continuously rising. This historical shift has be-
come  particularly  obvious  in  philosophy  of
mind. In the age of cognitive neuroscience and
Bayesian  modeling,  “raising  one’s  own age  to
the  level  of  thought”,  as  Hegel  put  it,  has
simply become an impossible task. On the other
hand, philosophers of mind are not embedded
journalists  of  the  neuroscience  industry.  A
philosopher’s task today clearly goes far beyond
offering methodological  criticism plus a bit  of
applied ethics. Philosophers should not confine
themselves to laying and clarifying some con-
ceptual foundations or just developing a local,
domain-specific  “conceptual  commentary”  on
the general  way in which the  empirical  Mind
Sciences change our perspective on reality and
the human mind’s position within it. In the fu-
ture, philosophers must more actively introduce
their own epistemic goals into the overall pro-
cess as well.  Failure to do so is  to exercise a
counterproductive sort of  epistemic humility—
and runs the risk of letting academic philosophy
slip into irrelevance.
Having  an  open  mind  also  means  that
there are no taboo topics. At the outset, philo-
sophy was the “love of wisdom” and, as every-
body knows, knowledge and wisdom are not the
same thing. Knowledge is  something that can
be accumulated in an incremental and system-
atic way, but wisdom has to do with synthesiz-
ing very different kinds of  knowledge in ways
that are practically relevant, for example with
respect to knowing what a good life is and, im-
portantly, also with being successful at living a
good life (Ryan 2014). This in turn may include
actively  minimizing  the  number  of  unjustified
beliefs one has and continuously maximizing the
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dynamic coherence between one’s beliefs, one’s
values, and one’s actions. Perhaps wisdom can
also be characterized by a sustained striving for
accuracy and for the possession of a wide vari-
ety of epistemically justified beliefs on a wide
variety of relevant subjects—with one such sub-
ject  being  the  deep  structure  of  the  human
mind itself.  In this case,  knowledge will auto-
matically  be  self-knowledge,  and  the  question
now becomes on what level the relevant form of
self-knowledge  is  to  be  found.  Tackling  this
problem may involve a commitment to a deeper
form of rationality that includes not only epi-
stemic  humility,  but  heightened sensitivity to-
wards moral issues and one’s limitations in both
fields.
It  now has  become dramatically  obvious
that  something  has  been  lost  along  the  way.
Academic  life  has  become  distinctly  unphilo-
sophical.  Professionalization,  acceleration,  and
excessive competition have led us into a form of
academic life that can now very rarely be de-
scribed as a good life. First, it seems safe to say
that many of the best and leading researchers
are not very successful at living a good life—
even if they are philosophers who, at least at
the beginning of their careers, may have had a
great interest in exactly what a “good” life in
the philosophical sense might be. Second, over-
heated  competition  increasingly  draws  people
into the field who are predominantly interested
in competition and professional success  per se,
and not so much in the pursuit of knowledge,
let  alone  wisdom.  But  intellectual  superiority
and insight are different things, just as know-
ledge and wisdom are. There is no intrinsic link
between striving for intellectual superiority and
being intellectually honest, practicing epistemic
humility and cultivating an atmosphere of char-
itable collaboration. In academic philosophy, the
sapiential  dimension,  in  which  theoretical  in-
sight and practical know-how are deeply inter-
woven,  has  now  been  lost  almost  completely,
and one aspect  of  what it  means to have an
open  mind—as  opposed  to  just  being  profes-
sional,  knowledgeable,  and  smart—is  to  be
aware of this fact and to be ready to face it. 
We, the editors, certainly do not claim to
know what exactly philosophy really is or what
it is to lead a good life, nor do we always agree
on these questions—but we are convinced that
whatever the answer is, it is deeply connected
with a particular kind of attitude that reaches
back all the way to the skeptical tradition, East
and  West.  Philosophy  at  its  best  is  not  just
purely academic or technical: it is also a prac-
tice, a way of life; and its theoretical and prac-
tical dimensions should never be completely in-
dependent of each other. This is what we mean
when we say that academic philosophy would
greatly profit from a sapiential dimension. And
if we are right to say that philosophy is, among
other things, an epistemic practice, a particular
style of thinking resulting from the cultivation
of  an  open-minded  attitude  (and  one  that  is
skeptical, we might add, in the most construct-
ive  sense),  then  this  may also  suggest  a  new
reading of what it means to say that philosophy
has an important role to play in the Mind Sci-
ences. Asking for an interaction between cognit-
ive  neuroscience  and  philosophy  as  academic
disciplines is one thing—but asking for the in-
troduction of a particular way of thinking and a
particular  type  of  collaborative  practice—a
more genuinely  philosophical attitude—into sci-
entific  research  is  another.  We  hope  that  by
now it  is  clear  that  we think philosophy can
contribute  to  the  Mind  Sciences  in  both  re-
spects, as an academic discipline and as an epi-
stemic practice.  Still,  what we have been dis-
cussing here under the heading of open minded-
ness is first and foremost an example of philo-
sophy as an epistemic practice—and as such it
can be quite independent of philosophy as an
academic  discipline.  Indeed,  this  is  why  we
think that an important goal is  to put philo-
sophy, in this practical and classical sense, back
into philosophy in the academic sense as well.
We openly admit that we have no ready-
made answer to the question of how to re-intro-
duce the sapiential dimension into modern aca-
demic philosophy, in a way that is rational and
intellectually  honest.  In  fact,  we  think  this
might well be the biggest challenge for the fu-
ture. Obviously, what we call the “sapiential di-
mension” here has nothing to do with any kind
of theology or organized religion. And we sus-
pect that the real value of what we called “first-
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person methods” above may lie not in support-
ing dubious metaphysical arguments, but lies, in
part,  in  their  potential  for  reintroducing  the
sapiential dimension into academic philosophy.
But we also want to point out that this could
simply  be  empirically  false.  Sometimes  it  is
enough to remain with the question, to simply
see it for what it is and to face the facts. Some-
times things take care of themselves. As we said
when sketching the problem of subjectivity, to
have an open mind means to acknowledge (and
not repress) the fact that there may actually be
a  set  of  deeper  metatheoretical  ambiguities
here. Having an open mind can also consist in
admitting the existence of a problem—and that
is all we want to do here.
4.4 Developing new forms of interdiscplinarity
Taking empirical  constraints  into  account  has
become absolutely central in current philosophy
of mind. However, there are different models of
what good interdisciplinary practice is and how
empirical constraints are to be satisfied or integ-
rated. Interdisciplinary philosophy of mind does
not  simply consist  in  turning  away from old-
school  armchair  philosophy,  which  sometimes
took intuitions as main input for philosophical
work. And it would be false to say that “pure”
philosophy has no place in the newly unfolding
scheme of things—there is clearly relevant and
highly valuable work that has only a small em-
pirical component, or perhaps even none at all.
One aspect of the Open MIND approach is that
young philosophers should increasingly become
active as experimenters themselves, for instance
by proposing epistemic goals and novel experi-
mental  designs  to  empirical  researchers  and
even by joining their colleagues from different
disciplines to work on shared research projects.
Another  aspect  of  the  approach,  as  we noted
earlier, is that the extended principle of charity
applies not only to the relationship between dis-
ciplines, but also to that between different gen-
erations of researchers. 
We are all learning as we go along. Per-
haps most centrally and most obviously, to have
an open mind means to acknowledge the fact
that while there has long been an “interdiscip-
linary turn” in philosophy of mind, the real task
consists in creatively testing out and developing
entirely new  types  of interdisciplinary coopera-
tion. For example, it is important to preserve a
critical spirit and an openly inquisitive mindset
—interdisciplinarity must never be purely dec-
orative, a fashionable necessity, or reduced to a
rhetorical element in edifying Sunday speeches.
Along the way, we will also need a new under-
standing of progress, of acceptable forms of in-
quiry and methods, as well as new measures of
success, for instance concerning novel forms of
collaboration and publication formats that are
still under the radar of institutionalized impact
factors. 
To  give  a  second  example,  the  newly
emerged discipline of neuroethics is an import-
ant  and  innovative  form  of  interdisciplinary
philosophy, but it should never indirectly con-
tribute  to moral  hypocrisy,  as  a  fig  leaf  ulti-
mately used by others to cover the failure to
directly and open-mindedly address the political
issues  involved.  If  interdisciplinarity  becomes
merely strategic (e.g.,  in dealing with funding
agencies)  or  is  really  guided  by  off-topic
motives, then it loses its systematic force and
becomes counterproductive and stale.  Interdis-
ciplinary  philosophy  of  mind  is  not  simply
about being empirically informed, or about in-
troducing  strong  and  fine-grained  “bottom-up
constraints”  in  the  formation  of  new theories
about mind and consciousness. It may actually
be about the emergence of a new type of re-
searcher. We like the idea of “dyed-in-the-wool
interdisciplinarity”, where “dyed-in-the-wool” is
not used in a pejorative sense but indicates that
young philosophers have learned how to think in
a way that transgresses boundaries between dis-
ciplines, naturally and effortlessly. The classical
approaches were intuition-based, and they made
analytical philosophy one of the strongest intel-
lectual currents of the 20th century. But we are
now slowly moving from a priori methods and
thought  experiments  to  real  experiments,  and
from abstract metaphysical questions about the
relationship between mind and body to the in-
vestigation  of  specific  aspects  of  cognition
(Knobe 2015).  And  while  it  is  clear  that  an
open-minded philosophy of mind should not be
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strictly or exclusively data-driven, it is equally
true that it should be both empirically informed
and  informative,  guided  (but  not  completely
constrained) by empirical data and theoretical-
conceptual considerations alike.
In the end, there is also a sociological as-
pect  to  the  current  transition  in  our  under-
standing of what good philosophy amounts to.
Max Planck, the German theoretical  physicist
who created quantum theory and won the No-
bel Prize for Physics in 1918, famously said: “A
new scientific truth does not triumph by con-
vincing its opponents and making them see the
light, but rather because its opponents eventu-
ally die, and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it” (1948). As the editors of a col-
lection promoting, among other things, senior–
junior interaction, we think this may be a bit
too pessimistic—and once more, we leave it to
our readers to decide how successful this inter-
action was here, in this project. Still, for now, a
careful  suggestion  is  that  possibly,  the  old
should learn a little more from the young.
One  of  our  experiences  with  the  MIND
Group was that there was a difference between
what  one  might  call  “junior  mentoring”  and
“senior  mentoring”.  Junior  researchers  need
friends  in  neighboring  disciplines  whom  they
can  trust  and  ask  about  literature,  current
trends, and technical issues that are hard to un-
derstand. Our experience is that interdisciplin-
ary  exchange  works  best  in  excellent  young
people who are not yet on the job market, and
in non-competitive situations in which at best
no  holders  of  academic  resources  are  present,
such  as  senior  researchers  who  have  grants,
post-doc positions, etc. to give away. Good and
established systems of  senior–junior  mentoring
already exist, but we believe that given the cur-
rent situation, junior–junior mentoring is an im-
portant resource to be developed as well.  For
this reason, in the Open MIND project, we in-
stalled a form of junior–junior mentoring during
the  anonymous  peer-review  process  for  com-
mentaries. And while replies can be seen as a
form of senior-junior mentoring, there was also,
covertly in the form of target article reviews, a
phase of junior–senior mentoring, in which some
of our junior members not only wrote their first
reviews  ever,  but  now,  after  the  collection’s
publication,  can  also  see  for  themselves  how
their comments were implemented and whether
this maybe even led to an improvement of the
target  papers.  But  above  all,  it  is  important
that  young  people  from  the  same  generation
have the opportunity to meet each other and
form their own, autonomous networks based on
shared  interests and  mutually  shared  (or  ac-
quired) expertise. And this will require a radical
restructuring of research funding and of the uni-
versity system itself, as well as new subsidizing
schemes. The function of older, more mature re-
searchers may rather consist in creating and of-
fering such platforms, giving a better overview
of the intellectual landscape and offering insight
into what is really relevant in a specific phase of
a young researcher’s academic life.  Today, the
sociological aspect of what it means to have an
open mind has an unprecedented global dimen-
sion. In trying to promote young blood, mostly
in Germany, we found that language and cul-
tural barriers actually are often higher than we
wanted to admit. If  what we have said about
the  ethics  of  globalization  and  intercultural
philosophy here is correct,  then we might not
only need new formats of interdisciplinary and
intragenerational  collaboration,  but  also  new
types of intercultural mentoring as well.
 
As we said at the outset, instead of an introduc-
tion we wanted to begin a new conversation by
offering some first starting points and perhaps
even  first  building  blocks  for  a  fresh  under-
standing of what, today, it could mean to have
an  open  mind.  Once  again,  we  openly  admit
that we have no ready-made answers.  But we
are convinced that it is important to ask these
questions. Somehow, we have to get philosophy
back into philosophy. 
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